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TAINTED ASSETS AND THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL-THE MONEY LAUNDERING
CONUNDRUM*
KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY**
In today's law enforcement environment, sixth amendment right to
counsel issues have as much to do with lawyers' fee arrangements as they
do with the rights of lawyers' clients. If you asked criminal lawyers
across the country what the major concern of the criminal defense bar is
today, they would reply that the most pressing concern is an "intolerable
Sixth Amendment crisis"' created by government intrusions into the at-
torney-client relationship. The government has at its disposal an ex-
panding array of statutes and procedures that alter the attorney-client
relationship and implicate the sixth amendment right to counsel, you
would learn.
If you then asked these lawyers to catalog the offending practices, the
litany would read as follows.
Item one: The practice of issuing subpoenas to attorneys, summoning
them to provide the grand jury with financial information that relates to
their clients.2 The government wants to know the amount of the fee paid
for the lawyer's representation, the manner in which it was paid (i.e., was
it a large amount of cash), and the identity of the payor (i.e., is your
* The lecture upon which this article is based was delivered on September 15, 1987, at a
Washington University School of Law conference on "Original Intent and the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments." This conference was the seventh in a series of eight conferences, sponsored by the
Center for Judicial Studies, exploring the original intent and current interpretation of key provisions
in the Bill of Rights. The article is printed here with the permission of the Center for Judicial
Studies, Washington, D.C.
** Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
Since its presentation at the conference, this paper has been revised to reflect four significant 1988
federal court of appeals decisions on attorneys' fee forfeitures. Those decisions, however, compound
rather than resolve the right to counsel problem explored herein. My sincere thanks to Frank Miller
for his comments on the prior draft.
1. NACDL to Congres." Reform § 1957, Nat'l Ass'n of Crim. Def. Law. Washington Digest
(May 20, 1987), No. 6 at 1, col. 2.
2. See, eg., United States v. (Under Seal), 774 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct.
1514 (1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26
(2d Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985); In re
Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
(Shargel), 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Ousterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1983).
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client carrying around all of this cash, or did you obtain it from some
third party benefactor).
The reason the government seeks fee information from the lawyer is
item two: The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)3 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute (CCE).4 These
federal racketeering and drug laws require forfeiture of assets acquired
directly or indirectly through specified criminal activity.5 Fee informa-
tion the government obtains from lawyers may thus provide evidence
that their clients have assets subject to forfeiture. To compound the
problem, a prosecutor who decides to pursue forfeiture of those assets
may seek a pre-trial restraining order to prevent the client from transfer-
ring them to anyone-including his lawyer. The prosecutor may also
notify the lawyer that all tainted assets, including those already paid as a
fee for legal services, may be forfeited upon the client's conviction.
Item three is a relatively new provision in the Internal Revenue Code,
Section 60501. Section 60501 requires every person who receives more
than $10,000 in cash in connection with a trade or business to file a re-
port with the Internal Revenue Service.6 The implementing regulations
make clear that lawyers are engaged in a trade or business for purposes of
the reporting requirement.7 Thus, a lawyer may be required to inform
the government that client X paid a $100,000 fee in cash on the fourth of
July.8
And what if the lawyer has reason to know that some or all of the fee
is derived from the client's criminal activity? That brings us to item four.
A new federal money laundering statute9 makes it a crime knowingly to
engage in a monetary transaction with a financial institution if the
amount of the transaction exceeds $10,000 and the funds are derived
from specified criminal activity."0 Thus, if the lawyer knows that the
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982-& Supp. III 1985).
4. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984 & Supp. III 1985 & Supp. IV 1986); 21 U.S.C.
§ 853 (Supp. 11 1984 & Supp. III 1985 & Supp. IV 1986).
6. 26 U.S.C. § 6050(1) (Supp. III 1985).
7. 26 C.F.R. § 1.60501-1 (1987).
8. See generally Du Mouchel & Oberg, Defense Attorney Fees A New Tool for the Prosecution,
1986 DEr. C.L. REV. 57.
9. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957 (Supp. 1987).
10. The laundry list is lengthy, but it includes the racketeering and drug offenses discussed
above. The offenses are listed in a companion money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (Supp.
1987).
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client's money comes from an illicit source, the lawyer cannot deposit the
$100,000 fee in the bank without committing a crime.
This money laundering statute provides a useful vehicle for bringing
the right to counsel issues more sharply into focus. The constitutional
controversy this particular law has generated revolves around the ques-
tion whether the sixth amendment requires that legitimate attorneys' fees
be exempted from its reach.
Those who argue that attorneys' fees must be exempted do so on the
ground that otherwise, the statute would impermissibly chill the attor-
ney-client relationship. If fees were not exempt, the argument runs, law-
yers would be reluctant or even unwilling to represent entire categories of
defendants whose alleged criminal activity could taint the money used to
pay their legal fees. Lawyers would be exposed, in addition, to the risk
that they might have to reveal client confidences in order to prove they
did not know they were dealing with criminally derived property. Last,
but not least, the statute would create conflicts of interest for criminal
defense lawyers, whose fear of prosecution might inhibit thorough inves-
tigation of their clients' cases. I
The money laundering statute may trigger these concerns in two dis-
tinct contexts: (1) the case in which a lawyer knows at the time of pay-
ment that the fee is paid in crime-related assets; and (2) the case in which
a lawyer takes the fee not knowing that it is derived from criminal activ-
ity, but learns during the course of the representation that it has been
paid with the fruits of criminal activity.
The sixth amendment issues will vary, depending on which of these
two contexts confronts us. The second category of cases clearly raises a
host of substantial constitutional and ethical concerns.12 But we must
first address the threshold questions that arise when a lawyer knowingly
11. See Franklin, Fee Tale-Money Laundering Guidelines Worry the Defense Bar, N.Y.L.J.,
May 14, 1987, at 5, col. 2; Tarlow, RICO Report, 11 THE CHAMPION 35 (Feb. 1987). At one point in
time the House version of the bill contained a provision exempting bona fide attorneys' fees, see H.R.
REP. No. 855, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 1, 14, (1986), but that provision was eliminated by a
conference committee. 132 CONG. REC. E3821, E3822 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1986) (statement of Rep.
McCollum).
12. Some of those concerns are addressed in recently issued Justice Department Guidelines.
Under the Guidelines, an attorney who accepts tainted property as a bona fide fee for representation
in a criminal matter should not be prosecuted under the money laundering statute unless the govern-
ment has proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the lawyer actually knew the illegal origin of the
specific asset and unless the evidence proving the lawyer's knowledge does not consist of confidential
communications between the lawyer and the client during the course of the representation. United
States Dept. of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 9-105.400 (May 12, 1988).
1988]
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accepts crime-related money as a fee, for the answers could well moot the
remaining points. If criminal defendants were held to be constitutionally
entitled to use tainted assets to pay their legal fees, for example, attor-
neys' fees would be exempt from the reach of the statute. In that event, it
would make no difference whether (or when) a lawyer learned that a fee
had been paid with the proceeds of crime. Hence, the threshold question
of the right to use what both lawyer and client know are the fruits of
crime to pay the lawyer's fee.
Hypothetical Case A illustrates how the issues may arise.
A lawyer reads in the newspaper that a local bank was robbed of
$45,000 the preceding day. The newspaper account indicates that the
bank teller who handed over the bag of loot gave the robber more than he
asked for-i.e., "bait" money treated with a chemical that would turn
orange within a few hours.
The next day a new client comes to the lawyer's office, tells the lawyer
that he is a suspect in the robbery, and asks the lawyer for help. The
lawyer agrees to represent the suspect for $15,000, but tells him that the
fee must be paid in advance. "No problem," says the client, who later
produces a suitcase full of cash. Predictably, the bills have a distinctly
orange tinge.
At this point the lawyer balks. "Look," the lawyer says, "I don't want
this money. You'll have to pay the fee with some other assets." "You
must be kidding," replies the client. "If I had that kind of dough to
begin with, I wouldn't have robbed a bank."
May the lawyer accept the fee with impunity?13 The elementary ques-
tion this case raises is whether the sixth amendment guarantees the sus-
pect the right to use robbery proceeds to employ counsel to defend him.
In view of the way courts dealt with this issue before the forfeiture and
money laundering laws appeared on the scene, the facts of this hypotheti-
cal pose an unappealing sixth amendment case. In less exotic contexts
than those, courts have seemed less troubled by the notion that wrongdo-
ers should not benefit economically from their wrongdoing. Courts have
held that neither the attorney-client privilege, the fifth amendment privi-
13. Assuming the lawyer accepts the cash as a retainer, what will he do with it? The lawyer
certainly would not go around town paying for groceries and buying gasoline with obviously marked
money. Instead, at some point in time he would want to deposit the money in an escrow account
and-if questioned about its source by law enforcement authorities-assert the attorney-client privi-
lege. "You cannot require me to tell you about the money," the lawyer would say, "because disclos-
ing what I know might incriminate a client or reveal a client confidence."
[Vol. 66:47
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lege against self-incrimination, nor the sixth amendment right to counsel
entitles a client accused of criminal wrongdoing to use his lawyer as a
depositary for fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime. 14
The attorney-client privilege does not protect fruits and instrumentali-
ties of crime because it extends only to confidential communications
made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.15 Despite the client's fear
that disclosure of his fee arrangement may reveal incriminating informa-
tion, courts have concluded that "[p]rofessionally competent and in-
formed advice can be rendered by an attorney even though he or she
must disclose that a fee was a gem suspected to have been recently stolen,
currency with certain serial numbers, or a sum far in excess of the client's
reported income." 16 To erect a shield against disclosure of such informa-
tion would, in the courts' view, create "considerable temptation to use
lawyers as conduits of information or of commodities necessary to crimi-
nal schemes or as launderers of money." 7 Thus, delivery of criminal
evidence to a lawyer does not place it beyond the reach of the law."
Nor does the client's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion protect fruits and instrumentalities of crime possessed by the lawyer.
A lawyer who obtains evidence from a client must comply with a sub-
14. See, e.g., State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 710, 471 P.2d 553, 565 (1970).
15. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1975).
Although payment of a fee is a necessary prerequisite to obtaining legal advice, disclosure of the
fee does not inhibit communication of information the attorney needs to represent the client. In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 247-48 (2d Cir. 1986). Cf State v. Olwell,
394 P.2d 681, 684 (Wash. 1964) (criminal evidence does little, if anything, to aid the lawyer's prepa-
ration of the client's defense). Thus, even though a transfer of a fee to an attorney-including the
fruits of the client's crime-is made for the purpose of employing the attorney to give legal advice,
the fee information is generally not considered privileged.
16. In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984). See also In re January 1976 Grand Jury
(Genson), 534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1976) (affirming lawyer's contempt citation for refusing to comply
with subpoena ordering him to surrender money received as a fee from clients suspected of bank
robbery).
17. In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1984).
18. People v. Investigation Into a Certain Weapon, 448 N.Y.S.2d 950, 963 (1982). See also
People v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App. 3d 32, 237 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1987) (defense counsel who
obtains possession of physical evidence related to criminal charge against client must turn it over to
police or prosecutor); People v. Meredith, 29 Cal.3d 682, 631 P.2d 46, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981)
(attorney has duty not to remove or alter physical evidence so as to prevent prosecution from discov-
ering it); State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d 553 (1970) (attorney-client privilege does not entitle
attorney to act as depository for or to suppress criminal evidence); People v. Nash, 110 Mich. App.
428, 313 N.W.2d 307 (1981) (attorney has duty to turn evidence over to prosecution).
Once a lawyer obtains criminal evidence from his client, however, the lawyer may refuse to reveal
its source on the ground that to do so would violate the attorney-client privilege. People v. Nash,
110 Mich. App. 428, 313 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
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poena to produce the evidence unless the client could have refused to
produce it on fifth amendment grounds and the evidence was transferred
to the attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice-i.e., it was pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege.' 9
And what about the sixth amendment? Does the client's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel protect fruits and instrumentalities of crime pos-
sessed by the lawyer? No. A lawyer's refusal to accept robbery proceeds
as a legal fee will not implicate a suspect's sixth amendment rights,2"
even if the suspect otherwise cannot retain private counsel. The sixth
amendment grants the accused an absolute right to have counsel assist in
his defense2' and a qualified right to counsel of his choice.22 The accused
is entitled to employ counsel of choice if he can afford it, or to be repre-
sented by appointed counsel if he cannot.23
In hypothetical Case A, our robbery suspect is financially unable to
pay a lawyer to represent him. He has offered to pay not his money, but
money that belongs to the bank. He has no property in the money that
can lawfully pass to the lawyer.24 If he has no other assets, he is indi-
gent. If he is indigent, he is constitutionally entitled to appointed, but
not retained counsel.
A second reason these facts pose an unappealing sixth amendment case
19. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402 (1975). Cf. State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471
P.2d 553 (1970) (defense lawyer in possession of criminal evidence must comply with motion to
produce it; fifth amendment privilege applies to communications, not "real evidence").
Even if the evidence is not subject to subpoena because it is testimonial in nature, it nonetheless
remains subject to seizure under the fourth amendment because neither attorney nor client is re-
quired to authenticate it or aid in its discovery. Andreson v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473-74 (1976).
20. See, Clutchette v. Rusher, 770 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985); Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d
1200, 1207 (Alaska 1978); Anderson v. State, 297 So.2d 871, 875 (Fla. App. 1974); State v. Green,
493 So.2d 1178, 1182, 1184 (La. 1986). Cf In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir.
1976) (For purposes of this appeal from a lawyer's contempt citation, "[w]e express no opinion as to
whether the suspects having chosen to make [the lawyer] a witness to their crime [by paying their fee
with robbery proceeds], if such should subsequently prove to be the fact, may properly invoke the
Sixth Amendment to bar his eyewitness testimony at trial.").
21. Under current Supreme Court interpretation, the right to counsel is absolute for all offenses
except misdemeanors and petty offenses that do not result in the imposition of a sentence of impris-
onment. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
22. See, eg., Urquhart v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Ci-
cale, 691 F.2d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 1982); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209-12 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982). For a discussion of the origins of and limitations on the right to
counsel of choice, see Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeit-
ures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REv. 493, 506-10 (1986).
23. See id. at 504 n.49.
24. In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 369 (E.D. Va. 1967).
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is that federal and state laws uniformly criminalize the knowing receipt
of stolen property-including robbery proceeds.25 These statutes do not
condone a lawyer's receipt of stolen property either to protect a client
from the consequences of his crime26 or to keep as payment of a legal
fee.2 7 Yet the legislatures' failure to exempt attorneys' fees under these
statutes has never been thought to violate a robbery suspect's sixth
amendment right to counsel. Indeed, knowingly taking or secreting
fruits and instrumentalities of crime has long been recognized as both an
independent criminal offense2 and "an abuse of a lawyer's professional
responsibility."29 A lawyer may not accept stolen property as a fee be-
cause "[t]he privilege to practice law is not a license to steal."30
That brings us to hypothetical Case B. In Case B, it will be harder for
the lawyer to tell which of the client's assets are criminally derived be-
cause the client is under investigation not for robbery, but for trafficking
in drugs. During the preceding year, however, the lawyer had repre-
25. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
26. In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 369 (E.D. Va. 1967) (lawyer took robbery proceeds with
intent to return them to bank after client's trial).
27. United States v. Scruggs, 549 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1977).
28. See United States v. Scruggs, 549 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding conviction of lawyer
for knowingly possessing, concealing and disposing of robbery proceeds accepted as a fee, and for
obstruction of justice); United States v. Cameron, 460 F.2d 1394 (5th Cir. 1972) (reversing lawyer's
conviction of receiving stolen property because of erroneous jury instruction; lawyer accepted rob-
bery proceeds as a fee); Laska v. United States, 82 F.2d 672 (10th Cir.), cerL denied, 298 U.S. 689
(1936) (upholding conviction, as accessory to kidnapping, of lawyer who accepted ransom as a fee
and advised client how to launder remaining ransom money); State v. Wolery, 348 N.E.2d 351, 362
(Ohio 1976) (upholding conviction of lawyer for receiving stolen property, where some of property
appears to have been used to satisfy lawyer's fee); State v. Harlton, 669 P.2d 774 (Okla. 1983) (law-
yer convicted of crime of concealing weapon used in a crime suspended from practice). But see
Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1986) (vacating lawyer's conviction for hindering
prosecution and tampering with evidence on ground that statutes were unconstitutionally vague as
applied to attorneys during representation of criminal defendants).
Cf In re January 1976 Grand Jury (Genson), 534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1976) (affirming lawyer's
contempt citation for refusing to comply with subpoena ordering him to surrender money received
as fee from client suspected of bank robbery); State v. Olwell, 394 F.2d 681 (Wash. 1964) (reversing
attorney's contempt citation for refusing to produce material evidence of a crime because subpoena
was defective in that it required attorney to testify about matters confided by client).
29. In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713, 714 (4th Cir. 1967) (suspending lawyer from practice for taking
possession of stolen weapons with intent to conceal them until after client's trial). Cf. People v.
Laska, 109 Colo. 389, 126 P.2d 500 (1942) (per curiam) (refusing to reinstate lawyer who was dis-
barred following conviction for accepting kidnapping ransom money); People v. Laska, 105 Colo.
Rep. 426 (1940) (disbarring attorney in same case); State v. Harlton, 669 P.2d 774 (Okla. 1985)
(suspending lawyer convicted of concealing evidence).
30. Laska v. United States, 82 F.2d 672, 677 (10th Cir. 1936) (lawyer accepted ransom as a fee).
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sented another drug defendant and had learned that cocaine was the new
client's only steady source of income. When the client comes to pay the
retainer, he brings a suitcase full of $20 bills.
What does the lawyer do in this case? Under these circumstances the
lawyer would be charged with knowledge that the money is drug-re-
lated.31 But his receipt of the $15,000 fee with that knowledge would not
violate the money laundering statute, because the statute does not penal-
ize the receipt of tainted assets. It limits, instead, what the receiver can
do with them. Here the lawyer can spend $15,000 in cash, or deposit the
cash in the bank-but not all at once. It would be a crime under the
money laundering statute to knowingly deposit more than $10,000 in
crime-related assets.32 So in this case we have inconvenienced the law-
yer-perhaps not enough to keep him from representing the suspect, but
perhaps so.
Now consider Case C. The same drug suspect wants to pay the lawyer
not in cash, but with an airplane purchased (no doubt) with drug money.
The suspect executes a power of attorney in favor of the lawyer for the
purpose of transferring title to the plane, but demands that the transfer
occur in the Bahamas.33 After the title is transferred, the lawyer adver-
tises the plane and ultimately sells it for $140,000. The purchaser tenders
a certified check for the full amount.
At this point, what should the lawyer do? He has no need for a
$140,000 airplane. But if he accepts the check, he cannot deposit it with
knowledge that it is "derived from" proceeds of the client's drug-related
activities. And it would be unseemly to demand that a legitimate buyer
pay the purchase price in cash. Hence, the lawyer may decline to repre-
sent the suspect because the lawyer cannot lawfully obtain beneficial use
of the fee. So until the prospective client is able to locate another buyer,
31. Cf United States v. Werner, 160 F.2d 438, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1947) ("The receivers of stolen
goods almost never 'know' that they have been stolen, in the sense that they could testify to it in a
court room.... But that the jury must find that the receiver did more than infer the theft from the
circumstances has never been demanded.").
32. The money laundering statute also prohibits the lawyer from exchanging the $20's for $100
bills, or $1,000 bills into $50's in large quantities. Any transaction with a bank (or a money laun-
derer) must be structured in amounts less than the jurisdictional amount. The lawyer must, in
addition, report the receipt of the cash to the IRS under section 60501.
Although structuring transactions in amounts of less than $10,000 to avoid reporting require-
ments imposed under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act is a crime, see 31
U.S.C.A. § 5324(3) (Supp. 1987), the money laundering law-which is not a reporting statute-does
not expressly proscribe breaking up the deposits.
33. See United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 66:47
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or a lawyer who wants an expensive plane, or a dishonest lawyer, he will
be unable to retain private counsel.
In a variation, Case D, the drug dealer/client finds a legitimate buyer
for the plane. The client then offers to endorse over a check drawn paya-
ble to him by the buyer. The lawyer still cannot deposit the check, how-
ever, knowing that it is derived from the proceeds of a crime. Nor can
the lawyer advise the client to cash the check, because that would be
advising him to commit a money laundering offense. So once again, the
lawyer will not accept the client's fee.
All four cases are similar. In each, the lawyer knows that the fee is
criminally derived and his knowledge is gained from objective or external
factors, not through the client's privileged communications. Unlike Case
A, however, the lawyer in Cases B, C and D is permitted to take the fee.
But the money laundering statute limits the manner in which the lawyer
may dispose of the fee in Case B and prevents meaningful disposition of it
in C and D. Thus, in each of these cases the statute may operate as an
economic disincentive to represent the client and may stymie the client's
efforts to retain private counsel.
The critical question is whether this statutory disincentive is constitu-
tionally distinguishable from other kinds of financial embarrassment that
may dissuade private counsel from taking the case. Although the issue
has yet to be litigated under the money laundering statute, it closely par-
allels the basic question in attorneys' fee forfeiture cases arising under
RICO and CCE. The root problem is that the client does not have suffi-
cient untainted assets to pay counsel. When the reason for his inability
to pay is that the assets are subject to forfeiture, should the court exempt
an amount sufficient to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to protect the sus-
pect's sixth amendment right to counsel of choice?34
Courts in these cases are concerned about the possible in terrorem ef-
fect that attorneys' fee forfeitures will have on the availability of private
counsel. Because lawyers will be reluctant or unwilling to represent a
defendant with knowledge that at the end of the trial their fees may be
34. See United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1477 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring )
(court should exempt from forfeiture "minimal funds, reasonable in amount and subject to the
court's scrutiny, to employ counsel"), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (1987). See also United States v.
Monsanto, No. 87-1397, slip op. (2d Cir. July 1, 1988); United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 927
(4th Cir. 1987), rev'd sub nom United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (1988)
(en banc); United States v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp. 1541, 1559 (D. Utah 1987), rev'd, 841 F.2d 1485
(10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Estevez, 645 F. Supp. 869, 871-72 (E.D. Wis. 1986).
1988]
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forfeited, the argument runs, the defendant may be denied the right to
counsel of his choice.35
The right to counsel of choice is not, of course, absolute. It may be
subordinated to important governmental interests-as, for example, the
fair and efficient administration of justice.36 Thus, the question in the
forfeiture cases is the extent to which the government's interest in depriv-
ing wrongdoers of the economic base that enables them to engage in
ongoing criminal activity justifies infringing their right to choose and re-
tain private counsel.
In the view of some courts, the defendant's sixth amendment interests
outweigh the government's interest in depriving drug dealers and racke-
teers of their economic power base, unless the transfer of assets to an
attorney occurs as part of a sham or fraud.3 7 When the assets are trans-
ferred in payment for legitimate legal services, according to these courts,
the government's interests do not override the individual's right to use
his property to retain private counsel, even if the assets ultimately prove
to be tainted by the individual's criminal conduct. 38 Because the govern-
ment cannot directly prevent drug and racketeering defendants from re-
taining counsel to defend them, it should not be permitted to accomplish
indirectly-by threatening forfeiture-what it cannot directly do.3 9
35. Harvey, 814 F.2d at 921; United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1316-17 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Rogers,
602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985). See also United States v. Monsanto, No. 87-1397,
slip op. (2d Cir. July 1, 1988) (en bane); United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986),
modified, 809 F.2d 249 (1987). But see United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988);
People v. Superior Court (Clements), - Cal. App. 3d -, 246 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1988).
36. See supra note 23.
37. United States v. Monsanto, No. 87-1397, slip op. at 4746 (2d Cir. July 1, 1988); Harvey, 814
F.2d at 924, 927; United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v.
Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985). But cf. United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1474 (5th
Cir. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (1987).
38. Harvey, 814 F.2d at 927; United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
39. Harvey, 814 F.2d at 924; United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348 (D. Colo. 1985).
As a Fourth Circuit panel admonished in United States v. Harvey:
The right to counsel... [protects] the guilty as well as the innocent. It must certainly have
been created, therefore, on the assumption-indeed with the sure knowledge-that in exer-
cising the primary right to privately retained counsel, ill-gotten gains might be used by
defendants who would ultimately be found guilty.
Harvey, 814 F.2d at 924-25. Curiously-or perhaps not so curiously-the court neglected to explain
just what transforms an expectation that criminal defendants will pay legal fees with the fruits of
their crimes into a constitutional right to do so.
In any event, let us consider the implications of the sixth amendment framers' "sure knowledge"
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Although this has been the prevailing view in the district courts,
that, from time immemorial, criminal defendants have used ill-gotten gains to pay their lawyers' fees.
Does this mean that the sixth amendment guarantees our hypothetical robber a constitutional right
to pay counsel with the robbery proceeds? No, according to the court. And why not? Because, the
court tells us, when the government seizes a bank robber's loot, "the government seizes property
manifestly that of someone other than the accused and for preservative purposes." Id. at 926. "The
financial plight that may result to an accused from sequestration of contraband," the court contin-
ues, "is simply of a piece with that resulting from other vagaries of life that may make it impossible
to hire private counsel." Harvey, 814 F.2d at 926. But when the government attempts to sequester
other ill-gotten gains to which "no third party has a superior claim," it is attempting to do indirectly
what it cannot directly do-that is, to prevent the defendant from retaining counsel of choice. Id.
The distinction apparently rests, then, on title to the assets, not their unlawful acquisition. But
query whether this is a rational base line to draw. What if the client was not a bank robber but was,
instead, a bank teller who enriched himself at the bank's expense? If he has stolen the money out of
the till, he has committed larceny. See, eg., United States v. Clew, 4 F. Cas. 700 (C.C. Wash. 1827)
(No. 14,819). He has unlawfully taken money from the bank's possession, but-like the robber-has
acquired no title to the money. If, on the other hand, the teller has pocketed money handed over by
a customer without first placing it in the till, he has committed embezzlement. See, eg., Kramer v.
State, 116 Ala. App. 456, 78 So. 719, cert. denied, 201 Ala. 700, 78 So. 990 (1918). He has, by
misappropriating something lawfully in his possession, unlawfully acquired title to the property. For
a more extensive discussion of larceny and embezzlement and of the distinctions between the of-
fenses, see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT-r, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 8.1-8.6, § 8.8(a) (2d ed. 1986).
Are the embezzler and the thief on equal constitutional footing? Or is the embezzler-but not the
thief--constitutionally entitled to retain counsel with the fruits of his crime because he wrongfully
acquired ownership, and not mere possession? Surely the framers of the sixth amendment would not
have entrusted the contours of so important a constitutional right to the vagaries of theft law.
So perhaps the court meant something else. Perhaps the opinion's reference to third parties who
have a superior claim to the property related not so much to the concept of title as it related to the
concept of entitlement. As between the robber and the bank, the bank is entitled to the property.
The same would undoubtedly be true with respect to embezzled funds, irrespective of the question of
title.
But consider the possibilities. Suppose the client has been running a profitable boiler room securi-
ties operation that specializes in selling worthless securities. He is charged with mail and wire fraud.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982). As between the securities seller and his defrauded customers, the
customers are entitled to their hard-earned money. Would the court have said that under these
circumstances, the government could therefore seize the fraudulently obtained monies--"for preser-
vative purposes"-without implicating the seller's constitutional right to counsel? Or would the
court have been inclined to say that the government could sequester drug trafficking proceeds that
have not been reported as income-even though as between drug dealer and government, the gov-
ernment is entitled to the taxes owed and wrongfully withheld-if that action would impair the
dealer's efforts to retain private counsel? Although one cannot be sure of the outcome, the tenor of
the panel's opinion suggests that the court would not have been receptive to seizure or sequestration
of assets if that action would prevent the defendant from hiring counsel to defend him. See Harvey,
814 F.2d at 926.
The distinction drawn, then, is tenuous at best. Although the en bane opinion rejected the panel's
distinction between illicit drug proceeds and the robber's loot, it did not fully address the implica-
tions of that distinction. The en bane opinion dismissed the distinction on the ground that it would
not always be true that robbery proceeds were manifestly the property of someone other than the
robber. Instead, "the robber may have deposited the proceeds in his own account or otherwise
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whether it will withstand appellate scrutiny remains to be seen. Indeed,
a review of the brief but tortuous history of the reported court of appeals
decisions reveals that the law is in an unusual state of disarray.
The Fifth Circuit was the first to rule on the point. In United States v.
Thier,'° the court declined to rule on the constitutionality of attorneys'
fee forfeitures but found, as a matter of statutory construction, that assets
needed to pay reasonable and bona fide legal fees are exempt from forfei-
ture. Thier arose in the context of a pretrial restraining order that froze
all of the defendant's monies. In a subsequent case, United States v.
Jones,4" the court applied its holding in Thier to a post-conviction claim
by Jones' attorneys, who were seeking payment of their legal fees from
property that had been ordered forfeited. The court again held that as-
sets to pay reasonable attorneys' fees are exempt from forfeiture. A
portentous concurrence, however, noted the author's acquiescence only
because he was bound by Thier. "If I were free to do so," the concurring
judge wrote, "I would follow the recent en banc opinion of the Fourth
Circuit," which reached a contrary conclusion.42 The Fifth Circuit sub-
sequently agreed to reconsider Jones en banc.4 3 At this writing, the en
banc decision has yet to be announced.
The Fourth Circuit opinion to which the concurrence in Jones refers is
In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale.' A panel of the court
had earlier held in United States v. Harvey45 that the forfeiture statute
applies to attorneys' fees, but that such application is unconstitutional
because it violates the sixth amendment right to counsel of choice.
Although agreeing that the statute applies to attorneys' fees, the en banc
court reversed on the ground that the panel erred in finding a constitu-
tional right to use illicit assets to pay attorneys' fees. A petition for certi-
orari has been filed and, at this writing, is pending a determination by the
disguised them. Similarly, the assets sought to be forfeited... may well be 'manifestly' illicit, as is
the case where the defendant has piles of cash and no records of any legitimate income whatsoever."
Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 645. But see United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1510 (10th
Cir. 1988) (Logan, J., dissenting) (when bank and accused robber fight over ownership of funds, they
do so under traditional common-law property concepts; government's interest in forfeitable assets
differs in that it is grounded in public policy, not property rights).
40. 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (1987).
41. 837 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1988).
42. Id. at 1337.
43. 844 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1988).
44. 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane).
45. 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 66:47
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss1/5
COUNSEL AND TAINTED ASSETS
Court.4 6
The Second Circuit ventured into the fray in United States v. Mon-
santo. A panel of the court held that attorneys' fees are not exempt from
forfeiture and that the sixth amendment does not require their exemp-
tion.47 After rehearing the case en banc, the court reversed the panel and
held, per curiam, that the defendant is entitled to "access to restrained
assets to the extent necessary to pay legitimate (that is, non-sham) attor-
neys' fees" to defend the criminal charge and that such fees are exempt
from forfeiture.48 Unfortunately, however, no majority of the court
could agree on a rationale for this holding. Thus, the Second Circuit
points us to a result without a reason.49 At this writing, the time for
filing a petition for certiorari has not expired.
The Tenth Circuit has also fueled the controversy on this issue. In
United States v. Nichols,50 a three judge panel held that the forfeiture
statute does not exempt attorneys' fees from forfeiture and that failure to
exempt them does not deny the sixth amendment right to counsel of
choice. Predictably, one judge dissented. Although he agreed that the
statute does not exempt attorneys' fees from forfeiture, he would find the
statute unconstitutional to the extent that it prevents a defendant from
employing counsel to defend against the charge.51
And what accounts for such extraordinary judicial indecision on this
point? Courts in the forfeiture cases are concerned that if threatened
forfeiture of the means to pay counsel makes the defendant construc-
tively indigent, he will be relegated to appointed counsel. The full impact
46. No. 87-1729, 56 U.S.L.W. 3821 (April 11, 1988).
47. 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987).
48. No. 87-1397, slip op. at 4746 (2d Cir. July 1, 1988) (en bane) (per curiam).
49. Or, viewed differently, the court gave an abundance of reasons, none of which carried the
day. In addition to the per curiam opinion of the court, eight separate concurrences and dissents
were filed. See id. at 4746 (concurring opinion of Chief Judge Feinberg, joined by Judges Oakes and
Kearse); id. at 4750 (dissenting opinion of Judge Mahoney, joined in part by Judges Cardamone and
Pierce); id. at 4766 (opinion of Judge Cardamone, joined by Judge Pierce, concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 4768 (opinion of Judge Pratt, concurring in part and dissenting in part); id.
at 4771 (opinion of Judge Pierce, joined by Judge Cardamone, concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 4772 (concurring opinion of Judge Winter, joined by Judges Meskill and Newman); id.
at 4786 (opinion of Judge Miner, joined by Judge Altimari, concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 4788 (concurring opinion of Judge Oakes).
50. 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988).
51. Id. at 1509 (Logan, J., dissenting). Cf United States v. Unit No. 7 and Unit No. 8 of Shop
in the Grove Condominium, No. 87-2499, slip op. at 3, 15 (8th Cir. Aug. 5, 1988) (holding, under
facts of case, that government's effort to deprive defendant of assets needed to pay reasonable attor-
ney's fee impermissibly conflicted with fifth and sixth amendments).
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of this deprivation cannot be measured, the courts tell us, until we con-
sider the difference between retained and appointed counsel.
First, there is the question of adequacy. Question: "Did you have a
lawyer when you went to court?" Answer: "No, I had a public de-
fender."52 Courts in the forfeiture cases are concerned that RICO and
CCE defendants may be denied the effective assistance of counsel if they
are required to forego the luxury of a privately retained lawyer. 53 This
concern is not so much an indictment of the competency of public de-
fenders as it is a recognition of the limited resources available to them.5 4
Second, courts are concerned about the question of timing. Our hypo-
thetical client is under investigation. He has not been formally charged
with a crime. Indeed, the grand jury has yet to be convened. But he
wants guidance from counsel now, during the early stages of the investi-
gation, to ensure that his interests are protected throughout the entire
process. If we relegate him to appointed, rather than retained counsel,
he is not yet eligible for an appointed lawyer under the Criminal Justice
Act. The Act grants him a statutory right to appointed counsel only
upon the following conditions: (1) he must be charged with a felony or a
misdemeanor; or (2) he must be arrested and entitled by law to represen-
tation by an attorney; or (3) the sixth amendment must require the ap-
pointment of counsel. 5
Now we are getting somewhere. Linger over the third condition, for it
goes to the heart of the problem. Our hypothetical client will be eligible
for appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice Act when the Constitu-
tion requires that counsel be made available to him.
And when will that be? The sixth amendment right to counsel pro-
vides the accused the assistance of an expert at confrontational stages of
a prosecution to ensure the accused a fair trial. The right to counsel
attaches at "critical"56 or "trial like" stages of a "criminal prosecu-
tion,"5 7 not at preliminary stages of an investigation. This constitutional
right is enjoyed only by "the accused" and is provided "for his de-
52. See Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had a Public Defender, Yale
Rev. L. & Soc. Act., Spring, 1971, at 4.
53. See, eg., United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349-50 (D. Colo. 1985).
54. Id. at 1349 ("The costs of mounting a defense of an indictment under RICO are far beyond
the resources or expertise of the average federal public defender's office which is already
overtaxed.").
55. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1982).
56. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
57. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
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fence."58 "Of course,.. . it may well be true that in some cases preindict-
ment investigation could help a defendant prepare a better defense."59
But, as the Supreme Court observed, the controlling cases "have never
suggested that the purpose of the right to counsel is to provide a defend-
ant with a preindictment investigator."'  The Court has found "no rea-
son to adopt" such a "novel interpretation of the right to counsel."61
Thus, notwithstanding the legitimacy of the concerns voiced in the for-
feiture cases those concerns are not, by and large, addressed by the sixth
amendment. A generalized concern that a suspect would be better off if
he were represented by counsel while under investigation simply does not
implicate sixth amendment rights.
To return, then, to the defense bar's concern in the money laundering
context, established sixth amendment principles do not support the call
for a blanket exemption of attorneys' fees from the reach of the statute.
Although the statutory limitation on a lawyer's ability to launder large
amounts of tainted money through a financial institution may impede a
prospective client's efforts to retain private counsel, it does not inevitably
implicate the client's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. To invoke the
right to counsel on the mere possibility of prejudice-as courts in some
forfeiture cases have done-is, in truth, "to wrench the Sixth Amend-
ment from its proper context.,
62
58. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
59. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 191 (1984).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (case involving unsuccessful argument for extension of the sixth amendment right to
counsel) (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1971) (referring to the sixth
amendment right to speedy trial)).
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